The Conditions of Authorisation Review in England and Wales

Problem Statement

1. The primary policy objective of government authorised self-certification schemes is to improve the cost effectiveness and efficiency of ensuring compliance with the requirements of the Building Regulations. It is the Government's expectation that Schemes are managed in the public interest, with the welfare and the well-being and safety of the general public central to the service that they deliver.

2. We are publishing this statement as part of the Building Safety Regulators (BSR) commitment to completing a review of the Conditions of Authorisation (CoA) as detailed in its 2023-2026 strategic plan [1], and to seek views on the potential establishment of a fire doorset scheme. The CoA review also follows on from the Building Control Independent Panel's (BCIP) consultation on the issues raised by the Grenfell Tower Inquiry Report.

3. The review aims to ensure that the Schemes continue to support safe, compliant building practices and meet the needs of users. It will consider how the CoA can better support public safety, consumer protection, and regulatory efficiency.

4. Early discussions with stakeholders have highlighted several key areas for review, including:
   a. How scheme operators promote and communicate their activities
   b. How schemes vet and monitor their members
   c. How they handle complaints and resolve disputes
   d. How they apply sanctions when members break scheme rules
   e. The types of financial protection offered to consumers for installation work

Through the CoA call for evidence, we want to identify issues in the current system and find pathways to improve them. This will strengthen consumer confidence and ensure greater efficiency and accountability from schemes and their members.

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[1] BSR 2023-2026 Strategic Plan - Building Safety Regulator Strategic Plan 2023-2026

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1. Introduction to self-certification schemes and the Conditions of Authorisation

5. The Hackitt Review, commissioned in response to the Grenfell Tower tragedy, emphasised the need for a systemic shift towards a more robust and accountable regulatory framework.

    "The Review identified that the current landscape for ensuring competence is fragmented, complex and inconsistent - different disciplines have various routes for assessing competence which are not always clear or consistent."

    It introduced the concept of the "golden thread" of building information—structured, accessible, and verifiable data that supports safety throughout a building's lifecycle. The BSR's Strategic Plan builds on these principles, calling for a coherent, risk-based approach to regulation that promotes competence assurance, clear governance, and effective consumer protection.

6. The Building Safety Regulator (BSR) was established under the Building Safety Act 2022 to oversee the safety and standards of buildings in England. It ensures that those responsible for buildings are competent, accountable, and transparent. The BSR is responsible for overseeing and setting the standards that self-certification schemes must meet in England and this responsibility lies with the Welsh Government in Wales. Together, we ensure work is carried out safely and in compliance with the Building Regulations.

7. Self-certification schemes allow certificated individuals or businesses that operate across England and Wales to certify their own work as compliant with the Building Regulations without needing separate approval from local authority building control or a registered building control approver. Self-certification schemes were introduced under the Building Act 1984 to reduce administrative burdens and improve efficiency in building control, while maintaining the same standards. They are intended to enable proportionate regulation and give consumers confidence that certified tradespeople are competent and accountable.

8. Over two decades on since their introduction, the landscape in which self-certification operates has changed significantly. Section 35 of the Building Safety Act 2022 amends the Building Act 1984, creating powers to prescribe in the Building Regulations competence requirements relating to the Principal Designer and Principal Contractor (appointed persons), and any prescribed person. The Building Regulations may also impose duties on the person appointing the Principal Designer, Principal Contractor and any prescribed person to ensure that those they appoint meet the competence requirements. Whilst these regulations apply in England, the Welsh Government has introduced similar changes that will come into force later this year.

9. These requirements apply to design or building work on **all buildings** and are applicable to grant funded measures delivered through government-enabled schemes (for example, Boiler Upgrade Scheme)**.** The intention for this provision is to ensure that individuals and/or organisations carrying out design work or building work are competent to do their work in a way that is compliant with the Building Regulations. For any design or building work on all buildings in England and Wales, it is intended that the Building Regulations set out these duties.

10. The Building Safety Act 2022 established the Building Safety Regulator (BSR) and introduced a new culture of accountability, competence and information transparency across the built environment. The Conditions of Authorisation (CoA) are the 21 criteria that scheme operators must meet to be authorised. Published in 2016, the CoA were designed for an earlier context and now require to be reviewed to ensure they remain fit for purpose.

11. The BSR's Strategic Plan sets out our commitment to review the COA to ensure these remain fit for purpose and continue to reflect the essential criteria Schemes must meet.   The strategic plan also commits to publishing and maintaining the Mandatory Technical Competence (MTCs) that are currently used in condition 3 and 9 of the CoA framework document.

12. This review seeks to gather evidence in relation to criteria in the CoA and efficiency of ensuring compliance with the requirements of the Building Regulations. Within this review we will consider how the CoA can better support public safety, consumer protection, and regulatory efficiency. The self-certification system should therefore provide an alternative, cost effective means of ensuring compliance with and help to reduce the level of unauthorised work carried out in the sector.

13. Following the recommendations made in Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 2 report, the Single Construction Regulator's creation was announced at the end of 2025 in England.

14. The new regulator will help ensure a well-functioning building system, which will support industry building the homes this country needs. The COA review will continue to remain a focus of the BSR as we transition to the Single Construction Regulator in 2026.

15. The Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) is commencing evidence gathering about the effectiveness of the Schemes with a view to that supporting possible Scheme reforms. This CoA call for evidence will provide a useful evidence starting point as part of that.

16. In December 2025, MHCLG published the Single Construction Regulator prospectus, which also committed to develop a new strategy for the built environment professions, trades and occupations, to be published in 2027. This will seek to "...rationalise and strengthen the system of regulatory oversight and enforcement for the building professions... simplify the current patchwork of professional regulation and establish a central oversight function that focuses on a clear and coherent set of standards, expectations and outcomes", alongside wider non-regulatory levers. Work on this profession's strategy will include further MHCLG evidence gathering.

2. The Current Conditions of Authorisation - The case for change?

17. Recent independent reviews have revealed persistent weaknesses in the oversight of the organisations involved in the central administration of the self-certification scheme system. Common themes include:

a. How scheme operators promote their activities;

b. Their vetting and monitoring practices;

c. Their complaints and dispute resolution processes;

d. Their use of sanctions regarding members who breach scheme rules; and

e. The appropriate financial protection models that are provided for consumers as cover for installation work.

18. The National Audit Office (NAO [2]) value for money report, published in October 2025, found that poor data visibility and fragmented oversight mechanisms significantly delayed the identification of defective work in government-enabled schemes such as the Energy Company Obligation (ECO4) and the Great British Insulation Scheme (GBIS). These delays had tangible consequences: consumers were left with substandard installations; local authorities lacked the information needed to take corrective action.

19. The absence of integrated data systems meant that information about installer performance, audit outcomes, and consumer complaints was often siloed, making it difficult to detect patterns of non-compliance or emerging risks. This fragmentation not only resulted in financial loss for both consumers and Government but also eroded trust in the regulatory framework. The NAO's findings underscore the need for a more coherent and transparent data infrastructure that enables timely oversight, supports risk-based enforcement, and facilitates learning across schemes. As part of this review, the BSR will explore how these lessons can be incorporated into the CoA.

20. The National Home Improvement Council's (NHIC) report, published in July 2025, found [3] significant gaps in consumer protection across self-certification schemes, particularly in relation to unclear guarantees, limited redress options, and inconsistent financial safeguards. Their report revealed that many consumers are unaware of the protections available to them, and that scheme operators often failed to communicate clearly about what guarantees apply, how complaints are handled, and what recourse is available when installations go wrong. In some cases, consumers were left without meaningful redress due to vague or inaccessible complaint procedures.

21. The NHIC has called for stronger safeguards, including property-linked guarantees, capped deposits, and clearer escalation routes for disputes. These recommendations point to the need for a more consistent and transparent approach to consumer protection across all schemes. As part of this review, the BSR will explore how these recommendations can be incorporated into the CoA, with a focus on ensuring that consumers are well-informed, adequately protected, and able to access fair and timely redress when needed.

22. The CMA's report published in October 2023, highlighted that within the green heating and insulation sectors [4] consumers often struggle to understand the scope and limitations of

[2] NAO - Energy efficiency installations under the Energy Company Obligation - NAO report

[3] National Home Improvement Council - Protect What Matters: Financial Protection for Smarter Home Improvements Protect What Matters - The NHIC

[4] Competition & Markets Authority – Good Practice Principles for Standards Bodies Good practice principles for standards bodies

scheme coverage and how installers are vetted, and what steps to take when things go wrong. They found that this lack of clarity not only undermines trust in individual schemes but also distorts the market by allowing operators with weaker consumer safeguards to compete unfairly against those who invest in robust governance and transparency.

23. The CMA's analysis strongly supported the need for standardised practices across all schemes, including harmonised complaint-handling protocols, transparent marketing communications, and clear financial protection models. The review will therefore consider how to ensure that schemes operate fairly and consistently, with a particular focus on improving consumer awareness and promoting a level playing field across the self-certification landscape.

Scope of the Call for Evidence

24. This call for evidence seeks to inform a comprehensive review of the Conditions of Authorisation (CoA) that underpin the operation of government-authorised Scheme operators. The scope of the call for evidence is to support a comprehensive review of each condition, identifying areas for improvement associated with each condition, ensuring they continue to remain fit for purpose. Additionally, this call for evidence seeks to gather views and evidence in respect to the benefits of establishing a self-certification scheme covering the installation and replacement of fire doorset.

The scope of the call for evidence covers:

- Governance and accountability: how scheme operators demonstrate compliance, transparency and oversight of members
- Competence and training standards: whether the requirements for technical competence and continuing professional development remain appropriate, measurable and consistent across schemes.
- Regulatory competence - defined as the capability to interpret and apply legislative requirements – is this being supported by CPD requirements that are appropriate, measurable, and consistent across schemes
- Consumer protection and financial safeguards, including their advertising: how consumers are protected when things go wrong, including clarity of information, access to redress and insurance-backed guarantees.
- Data reporting and intelligence sharing: how schemes collect, manage and share data with the Building Safety Regulator, local authorities, and other key stakeholders.
- Monitoring, auditing and enforcement: how oversight mechanisms detect and address non-compliance among scheme members and operators themselves.
- Alignment with the Building Safety Act 2022 and the BSR's Strategic Plan: ensuring that CoA expectations reflect the Act's focus on competence, accountability and information transparency
- Establishment of a self-certification scheme covering the installation and replacement of fire doorset.

The following areas will not be explored via this call for evidence:

- Broader building control reforms unrelated to self-certification or the CoA framework.

- Schemes or installers not under MHCLG and Welsh Government Ministers authorisation.

3. Our approach to taking forward the work

25. This call for evidence will refer to the 21 conditions that are set out in the CoA framework document to help consider how self-certification scheme operators demonstrate that they have the managerial, financial and technical ability to operate a scheme and comply with the appropriate regulatory processes and requirements. This will help shape future considerations as to whether a change the government's approach to oversight of the self-certification schemes is required and if so how.

26. Currently, there is a CoA framework document for England and another for Wales. However, both documents have the same conditions, therefore, this call for evidence will also help inform the Welsh Government's approach in Wales.

4. The role of self-certification schemes in the Building Regulatory Regime

Roles, Responsibilities and Accountability of Scheme Operators

27. Effective governance is essential to ensuring that scheme operators act transparently, impartially and in the public interest. The CoA outlines responsibilities for Scheme Operators; however, stakeholder engagement suggests variation in how these are interpreted and evidenced. Some schemes have clear governance models with independent oversight boards, while others rely heavily on parent organisations.

28. This section explores whether current governance arrangements are sufficiently robust and whether clearer standards or oversight mechanisms are needed to strengthen accountability and trust in the self-certification system.

5. The relationship between Scheme Operators and their registered businesses

Member Vetting and Oversight

29. The CoA states installers must demonstrate to the scheme operators that they possess the technical competence required to carry out work in compliance with building regulations. As part of member vetting and oversight, Condition 8 requires scheme operators to establish scheme rules, including its application and certification processes and fee structure. Condition 14 requires Scheme operator to use an agreed mechanism to make available the names of former registrants whose registration has been terminated by the scheme and the reason for termination to prevent potential scheme hopping.

30. Registered businesses are thoroughly evaluated by scheme operators to demonstrate they meet all technical competence requirements relevant to their trade — including assessment procedures and on-site inspections. Recent reports found that many installations under government-enabled schemes were carried out by uncertified subcontractors, resulting in poor workmanship and non-compliance.

31. Condition 10 sets out current practices including training programs and periodic reassessments to keep members aligned with regulatory changes and technical standards. Transparent membership criteria and publicly accessible assessment records are also seen as mechanisms which strengthen accountability.

32. Impartial governance and safeguards against conflicts of interest, independent oversight arrangements and the incorporation of technical expertise and consumer representation, are widely seen as approaches which support balanced decision-making.

33. This section invites views on how schemes assess and monitor member competence, whether current oversight arrangements are sufficient, and how transparency in membership criteria and performance data could be improved to enhance accountability.

Monitoring, Enforcement, and Sanctions

34. The CoA requires schemes to have effective sanctions in place for dealing with non-compliance with the Building Regulations and/or a breach of scheme rules by registrants of the scheme. Condition 13 requires scheme operators to set out and apply sanctions against registrants where non-compliance against the building regs has been recorded.

35. The United Kingdom Accreditation Service (UKAS) sanctions under UKAS Gen-1 (Section 6) where a scheme operator fails to meet accreditation requirements are being considered. In UKAS terms this maps to partial, financial, voluntary, suspension, reduction of scope, and full suspension including withdrawal of accreditation.

36. Enforcement mechanisms aim to ensure that scheme members and operators remain compliant and accountable. Currently, Condition 12 requires periodic surveillance, however the type and strength of enforcement applied when issues arise differ significantly among operators.

37. The NAO (2025) report on ECO4 and GBIS found that delayed and inconsistent enforcement due to lack of available and timely information allowed poor practice to persist for extended periods, undermining consumer trust and scheme effectiveness. Translating these lessons to self-certification underscores the need for clear, timely, and proportionate responses when members breach rules.   It is important to recognise that breaches under government-enabled schemes such as ECO4 and GBIS are not always equivalent to contraventions of the Building Regulations. Scheme rules and standards (PAS2030, PAS2035) non-compliance may relate to administrative or quality-assurance requirements that fall outside the statutory remit of building control.

38. This section seeks views on whether current surveillance and sanctions are proportionate and effective, and whether a more consistent enforcement framework should be introduced.

Competence and Training Standards

39. Installer competence is evaluated by scheme operators using common assessment procedures. Installers must demonstrate they meet current MTCs criteria by having the necessary qualifications, assessments, and experience as measures of demonstrating competence, detailed in condition 9. Condition 10 makes the provision for scheme operators to ensure their registrants competencies remain up to date by providing for example training courses, seminars, distance learning, as appropriate to meet any changes to the Building Regulations and/or BS/EN standards or technical approvals.

40. Competence underpins public safety and regulatory compliance. As noted by the NHIC and CMA, inconsistent training standards can perpetuate poor workmanship. The same principle is also reflected by the NAO, which substantiates how vulnerable or low-income consumers are disproportionately affected when installations fail.

41. The BSRs Industry Competence Committee (ICC) and Construction Skills Mission Board 5 are providing strategic leadership, assistance and encouragement to facilitate the improvement of competence in the built environment industry, supporting Government to deliver on the promise of 1.5 million new homes.

42. Ensuring ongoing competence among installers and assessors is vital to the long-term success of the self-certification system. Technological advances, new building materials, and regulatory changes mean that skills need continuous improvement.

43. This section seeks views on how installer qualifications, ongoing training, and competence assessment can be improved to ensure consistent standards across schemes and alignment with evolving technologies and regulations.

6. The relationship between Scheme Operators and consumers

Consumer, financial Protections, Complaints and Resolution

44. The CMA report highlighted the current standards landscape is complex, leading to confusion and significant challenges in consumer awareness. Research has shown compliance monitoring across different sectors varies. Should compliance monitoring be inconsistent or unclear, consumers cannot easily understand who is responsible for enforcing standards, which reduces their awareness and confidence in the system. Typically, consumers only become aware of standards bodies when something goes wrong and require assistance to rectify non-compliant work.

45. The foundation for consumers to have access to compensation or completion of remedial work requires the following of consumer contract terms and services as set out in the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (CRA2015) [6]The level of financial protection available to consumers through current market products should:

[5] Construction Skills Missions Board - Government unleashes next generation of construction workers to build 1.5m homes - GOV.UK
[6] Consumer Rights Act 2015 - Consumer Rights Act 2015

- Offer sufficient coverage to compensate for losses or remedial work when services fail or goods are defective.
- Be accessible and affordable, without imposing disproportionate costs on consumers.
- Provide certainty and speed in resolving claims, minimising financial risk and inconvenience.
- Align with best practice standards, ensuring that consumers are not left exposed to significant financial harm due to inadequate protection mechanism

46. Financial protection is a fundamental component of self-certification schemes, underpinning consumer confidence and supporting trust in the system. Feedback received from stakeholders and combined with consumer reports from Citizen's Advice [7]and Consumer Scotland[8] highlights consumers do not know what they are signing up to or what cover they are getting for the work and how to access the cover.

47. In practice, the range of financial safeguards — from deposit protection to insurance-backed guarantees — is inconsistent across schemes. Fragmentation within the sector has been identified as one of the biggest barriers to consumer trust, with a varied approach to cover offered to consumers, ranging from robust, comprehensive cover to limited or no protection beyond statutory requirements. This variability creates uncertainty for consumers and undermines confidence in the self-certification system.

48. The NAO found that weaknesses in oversight under energy-efficiency schemes left some households with poor-quality installations that were not identified or addressed promptly. It reported that responsibilities for consumer protection were spread across multiple organisations, creating gaps and overlaps that made it harder for consumers to navigate the system or understand who was accountable when problems arose. The CMA equally stressed the need for simple, uniform financial protections, clearly explained at the point of contract. Ambiguity about liability — whether resting with the installer, the operator, or a third-party insurer — undermines the entire assurance framework.

49. A robust complaints and dispute-resolution framework is a central element of consumer protection within self-certification. Under the current CoA, scheme operators must maintain accessible and effective complaints resolution processes. In practice, the mechanisms for compliance vary across Schemes. Investigations into ECO4 and GBIS revealed that consumers affected by poor workmanship often struggled to identify the correct channel for redress with many passed between different dutyholders without a clear escalation route.

50. The NHIC 'Protect What Matters' report, published in July 2025, recommended a single, recognisable redress model across all certification frameworks — one that guarantees timely correction or compensation where work fails to meet standards. It also proposed stronger coordination among regulators to ensure that data from complaints informs risk-based surveillance. Similarly, the CMA found that inconsistency in complaint handling and

[7] Citizens Advice – Home safe: giving consumers confidence to install low carbon technologies
Home safe: giving consumers confidence to install low carbon technologies - Citizens Advice
[8] Consumer Scotland-National action needed to protect consumers in Scotland's green heating transition National action needed to protect consumers in Scotland's green heating transition | Consumer Scotland

the absence of transparent reporting create confusion for consumers and reduce market discipline.

51. This section examines whether current financial safeguards, guarantees, and consumer communications are sufficient, and how they could be made clearer, more consistent, and more enforceable. We also invite views on how schemes handle complaints, whether dispute resolution mechanisms are accessible and timely, and how complaint data can be better used to inform oversight and improvement

Promotion and Alignment between schemes

52. Clear promotion and financial transparency are fundamental to the integrity of self-certification. Consumers need to understand what self-certification entails, the protections it offers, and how schemes are funded. However, evidence indicates that awareness remains low and communication inconsistent. Currently condition 6 and 7 of the CoA requires scheme operators to promote their work and ensure the financial viability of the scheme to registrants and consumers.

53. Alignment with other schemes is an important factor to ensure transparency, regardless of whether the work was grant funded or paid up front. The products and protection provided for the work should be the same.

54. The NAO found that weaknesses in oversight under ECO4 and GBIS were partly driven by the complex and overlapping roles of multiple organisations involved in scheme delivery. This fragmentation contributed to a system that consumers found difficult to understand, particularly when seeking support or redress for poor-quality installations.

55. Additionally, scheme operators lacked transparency in how funds were used, with some cases involving suspected fraud and overclaiming for installations. These findings underscore the need for clearer marketing practices, robust financial oversight, and consistent consumer guarantees—principles that are essential not only for government-backed schemes but also for maintaining the credibility of self-certification frameworks.

56. The NHIC report highlighted that poor financial transparency — such as hidden fees, variable warranty terms, and lack of clarity about who holds liability — continue to cause confusion. The report further highlighted fragmented protections and inconsistent communication across schemes, particularly around fee structures and hidden costs.

57. The CMA analysis of home-improvement markets similarly concluded that opaque pricing and lack of comparative information reduce competition and can disadvantage consumers.

58. This section invites views on how schemes communicate the protections available whether financial information is presented clearly and consistently, and how transparency in funding and promotion of activities can be improved to strengthen confidence.

8.Data Reporting and Intelligence Sharing between the key stakeholders of the Building Regulatory Regime

59. Reliable, accessible data is the foundation of effective regulation. Stakeholders have consistently highlighted that fragmented data systems and inconsistent reporting formats hinder effective oversight and policy evaluation. Building control authorities, accreditation bodies, and scheme operators currently use different platforms to record and share information.

60. The recent call for evidence conducted by DESNZ on "Improving the visibility of distributed energy assets" highlights the importance of data reporting and sharing between stakeholders and the regime[9]. Respondents were invited to share views on the types of asset data to be collected and to which access is required, in order to help unlock flexibility and support better network planning and management. The evidence showed strong support for improved asset visibility and the emergence of key themes and barriers.

61. The Construction Products Green Paper[10] published by MHCLG acknowledges the importance of data gathering as the move to a single construction regulator may lead to a requirement for data to be collected at a product level.

62. Reliable data is the foundation of modern regulatory systems. In the context of self-certification, accurate and timely information allows regulators, local authorities, and scheme operators to detect risks early, measure performance, and maintain consumer confidence. At present, however, information exchange between the various actors — scheme operators, Certification Bodies, Government Departments, local authorities — remains fragmented.

63. Work has commenced on updating the technical competency descriptors used in the MTCs with input from scheme operators. Earlier this year the existing notification system was made obsolete with a new self-certification notification system in its developmental phase. Future development goals include modernising the system to capture more comprehensive data, such as identification of high-risk buildings to updating technical competency descriptors. The regulator is exploring how these changes might affect local authorities and IT providers. A key technical concern discussed was the inconsistent handling of Unique Property Reference Numbers (UPRNs), which affects data completeness and processing.

64. This section explores how schemes collect, manage, and share data with regulators and local authorities, and whether improvements are needed to support transparency, risk detection, and joined-up oversight. Evidence is sought on the barriers preventing consistent data sharing between scheme operators and other key actors of the system and whether digital tools and systems could be implemented to facilitate the transfer of data, such as a standardised data model.

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[9] DESNZ Improving the visibility of distributed energy assets: call for evidence - GOV.UK
[10] MHCLG Construction Products Reform Green Paper 2025 (HTML) - GOV.UK

9. Establishment of a fire doorset self-certification scheme

65. The installation of fire doorsets in new buildings and the installation or replacement of fire doorsets in existing buildings is a common type of safety building work under the Building Regulations 2010. The adaptation or refurbishment of fire doorset components in an existing building can also be building work in certain cases. There are currently no existing self-certification schemes permitted to carry out building work related to fire doorsets. As an example, even though not all maintenance or adaptation of existing fire doorsets is building work, the cases that are building work and relate to fire doorset in HRBs must currently go through the BSR's established Gateway process to keep residents safe. In Wales, it is local authorities who must oversee HRB work. Building control bodies in England and Wales have to be appointed to review non-HRB fire doorset building work. The establishment of a self-certification scheme covering the building work related to fire doorset would allow for this type of work to be deemed as self-certifiable, without the need for formal approval through either the HRB process (by the BSR Gateway process in England or by the local authorities in Wales for HRB work), or building control bodies for non-HRB work throughout England and Wales. This can lead to a more beneficial outcome by saving significant time and cost for those carrying out this type of work whilst maintaining standards, increasing transparency, and reinforcing dutyholder responsibility.

66. For the purposes of this call for evidence, the definition of a fire doorset in approved document B is adopted: A door or shutter which, together with its frame and furniture as installed in a building, is intended (when closed) to resist the spread of fire and/or gaseous products of combustion and meets specified performance criteria to those ends.

67. NOTE: A fire doorset may have one or more leaves. The term includes a cover or other form of protection to an opening in a fire resisting wall or floor, or in a structure that surrounds a protected shaft. A fire doorset is a complete door assembly, assembled on site or delivered as a completed assembly, consisting of the door frame, leaf or leaves, essential hardware, edge seals and glazing, and any integral side panels or fanlight panels in an associated door screen.

10. Next Steps

68. We will shortly publish our call for evidence questions on GOV.UK, providing a 12-week period from the date of publication to respond. BSR will work with MHCLG, the CCA's Office and OGD, existing schemes, certified bodies and interested organisations and individuals, to identify and collect positions and data that test our early positions.

69. Responses received to this call for evidence will inform recommendations on how the Conditions should be revised. Our intention is to publish a set of recommendations before the end of the year 2026.

Annex

BSR - Building Safety Regulator

CMA - Competition & Markets Authority

CoA - Conditions of Authorisation

DBT – Department for Business and Trade

DESNZ - Department for Energy Security and Net Zero

ECO4 - Energy Company Obligation

GBIS – Great British Insulation Scheme

ICC - Industry Competence Committee

MTCs - Mandatory Technical Competence

NAO - The National Audit Office

MHCLG - Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government

NHIC - National Home Improvement Council

OGD - Other Government Department

CCA – Chief Construction Adviser